Azzurri Out The Abyss?

After a surprise resignation, Luciano Spalletti led the holders through a tough European qualification campaign. They knocked the North Macedonia curse, ground out a gritty performance to Ukraine, but has his tactics taken Italy out of the abyss, or are they about to fall back into uncertainty?

This tactical preview has been written by Joel Parker.

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Ready to respire to his Tuscan farm, Spalletti had achieved immortality in Napoli. A team that had stormed to the Scudetto and the missing piece in his storied coaching career. Spalletti had described working under Aurelio De Laurentiis, Napoli’s ferocious owner, as “like a horror movie”, but at least he had a happy ending. To get him out of his old tractor was going to take one very important phone call.

Not far from the farm is Italy’s training base, Coverciano, where Roberto Mancini had set up his office after they had failed to qualify for the 2018 World Cup. Mancini had led the national team for five years, going unbeaten in 37 games and having brought the Euros back Rome from England’s doorstep. From that Euros victory, Mancini’s story with the national team faced difficult chapters: another World Cup missed at the expense of North Macedonia and a rocky road through the Euro qualifying group, but his resignation last August still took everyone by surprise.

With the Scudetto-winning coach available, Italy made the move but Spalletti wasn’t inheriting the same unit that brought Mancini, and his ex-Sampdoria teammates, their Wembley redemption. Giorgio Chiellini and Lorenzo Insigne bowed out from duty, Marco Verratti and Leonardo Bonucci had featured in the Nations League in June but were not welcomed by the new coach in September. Ciro Immobile was in that September squad but has not featured for Italy since. 

Just four from the starting eleven that triumphed at Wembley featured in Spalletti’s provisional squad. So what do the unfamiliar-looking holders consist of? Has Spalletti had enough time to build his vision for the national team? 

New requirements in the 4-3-3 system

Just how much can one formation change between coaches? Mancini accomplished EUROs success with a flexible but structured system, which built roads through the halfspace of their opponents. Spalletti’s aims as a coach are very different, during his time in Napoli, he explained that “systems no longer exist in football, it’s all about the spaces left by the opposition. You must be quick to spot them and know the right moment to strike, have the courage to start the move even when pressed.”

With this in mind, we can pinpoint the amount of adaptations in front of the center-backs as Spalletti looking for the spaces that have been left by the opponent, his Italian team has embodied this approach too. A lot of dynamism is created by the positioning of the two fullbacks, who more often than not are Giovanni Di Lorenzo and Federico Dimarco. Against low block opponents, Di Lorenzo will join in a lot more attacking combinations, and Spalletti has encouraged Di Lorenzo to move into more forward positions depending on what spaces open, but his role in the national team has usually been sitting in the defensive line more often than his fullback partner. Regardless of who is being selected, this dynamic can still form. For Inter, Dimarco often moves into central spots to be alongside the striker and for Italy, he has also moved into an inverted position to join the midfield rotation.  

Italy 5-2 North Macedonia (14th minute): Different positioning of the fullbacks and midfield created a new route to exploit the opposition’s man-marking. As Gatti stepped up with the ball, the passing lane opened to Dimarco and Jovan Manev was too far away to put pressure on the receiver. Dimarco fed Chiesa down the channel.

The center can see a lot of different occupants taking up different positional arrangements: this can come through both fullbacks at the same time or movement between the lines coming from the center-midfielders. Double movements can be seen in the rotation, to unlock the third man runner, a combination often seen through Giacomo Raspadori or one of the right-sided wingers dropping out of the forward line and Nicolò Barella pushing into the space instead. Mateo Retegui can provide a similar service, whilst Gianluca Scamacca operates more centrally and his wall passes to Atalanta runners are one of the key strengths in Gasperini’s attack. 

Italy 2-1 Ukraine (8th minute): Double movements from Raspadori and Frattesi opened up Ukraine’s left side as Zaniolo dropped and the passing lane opened. Zaniolo connected with Raspadori and Frattesi’s third-man run was met.

If there is one strength in the Spalletti playbook it is that he can set up a versatile midfield. As well as fullbacks adjusting their positions, when the ball is moved into the final third, the far-sided center-midfielder often moves to the opposite flank to help combinations flow. Both Barella and Frattesi complement each other in this regard. Another relationship that has also grown in the center has been Barella with Jorginho. Situationally, Jorginho has even picked up the third-man run responsibility from Barella within their midfield combinations. 

Italy 5-2 North Macedonia (55th minute): Third man combination between Gatti, Barella and Jorginho. As Barella dropped into the deeper space, Jorginho began to curve his run forward and moved into the vacant space left by Jani Atanasov stepping up and Agon Elezi man-marking Bonaventura.

Despite the variety of different movements, the synergy was not always there for the Italians in their qualification campaign. Scamacca is a more physical striker option, who is capable of linking in longer patterns, but his short game is not as connective as Raspadori’s. This may explain Spalletti’s preference with a striker he had previously coached and the only goal Scamacca scored, a 3-1 defeat away to England, appearing in a performance where these rotations were less frequent against their defense. 

In the attack, Italy can also find themselves more geared to the left side as opposed to the right. This is understandable considering Dimarco and Federico Chiesa are positioned there, as well as Italy tilting their defensive line between phases, however, you can see the Jorginho and Barella partnership transfixing into one zone to try and feed them. With Di Lorenzo often positioned deeper, it could leave the right winger, Nicolò Zaniolo or Domenico Berardi less involved. 

It makes the squad all the more interesting when Zaniolo and Berardi have been ruled out due to injury. Matteo Politano was not even included, which left Bologna’s Riccardo Orsolini as their only left-footed right-winger option, but Spalletti did not take him beyond the provisional squad. Other omissions include Destiny Udogie, also out due to injury, and Manuel Locatelli, perhaps the biggest shock considering his continued involvement under Spalletti. Michael Folorunsho and Nicolò Fagioli, not involved in club action since early October due to the betting scandal, were included. Roma duo Bryan Cristante and Lorenzo Pellegrini complete the center-midfield options in the training squad, but has Spalletti been preparing something different with his team?

Luciano Spalletti's #Azzurri squad for #EURO2024 🇮🇹 💪#VivoAzzurro pic.twitter.com/RsMHbiAMoj

— Italy ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ (@Azzurri_En) June 6, 2024

The birth of the 3-4-2-1?

Ahead of Italy’s March friendlies against Venezuela and Ecuador, Spalletti described the opportunity of widening their horizons and rolling the dice on a different arrangement. In both of these games, Italy lined up in a 3-4-2-1 formation and Spalletti described the importance of versatility within the arrangement: “Tactics are fluid, liquid, it is no longer such a rigid form. There is the possibility of changing the system during a match based on movements. If we have the ability to shift, we become more unpredictable.”

When we look at the defenders from the provisional team, we can highlight players that can add to this flexibility. Four of these players come from Internazionale, perhaps the most flexible team in Serie A, who have produced effective wide rotations with center-backs moving forward at the same time – Alessandro Bastoni is the prime example. Another left-footed center-back who has transformed the league is Bologna’s Riccardo Calafiori, who was constantly encouraged to carry the ball forward by Thiago Motta. 

Center-backs moving ahead of the ball in Serie A has become a growing trend, and the other center-backs selected in the team have either served forward rotations or been apart in back three systems. Alessandro Buongiorno has sat in the middle of Torino’s back three, whilst Federico Gatti is usually located on the right for Juventus and Matteo Darmian has bounced between a right center-back and wing-back. Giorgio Scalvini would have added to the positional rotations down the right, but tore his ACL in the last game of the season against Fiorentina. Francesco Acerbi is also ruled out of the tournament due to a groin injury .

It’s not just the center-backs either, Spalletti also talked in depth about his fullback/wing-back options: “Players like Giovanni Di Lorenzo, Federico Dimarco, Destiny Udogie and Andrea Cambiaso represent the new frontier of European football. They don’t just run straight when attacking, they take detours and deviations, cutting inside and out. If a teammate is in a wider position, they go inside. It’s about reading the position based on the spaces that open up.”

Inconsistencies down the East Coast

Spalletti’s experiment got down to a terrible start when Italy met Venezuela in Florida. Building out from the back, Buongiorno stepped ahead of Di Lorenzo and Scalvini when the ball was with Gianluigi Donnarumma, standard practice with back three systems. As the Italians were pressed by Venezuela, who matched their formation, Scalvini made a pass to Udogie with Jon Aramburu baring down and intercepting a lax pass. Salomón Rondón was onside and ahead of Buongiorno and as the Torino center-back tried to recover, he dragged the striker down with him. 

Venezuela 1-2 Italy (1st minute): Buildup to Italy conceding a penalty. As Buongiorno stepped ahead of his center-back partners, this encouraged Gianluigi Donnaruma to pass the ball towards Scalvini as Venezuela pressed outwards. Aramburu beat Udogie to the ball and Buongiorno had to make a desperate recovery.

Donnarumma saved the penalty, but they still conceded from a calamitous buildup error when they tried to build out. The goalkeeper slipped past the pressing Rondón and played a central pass to Giacomo Bonaventura, but the pass to Buongiorno, positioned to the right of the box, was miscued and Darwin Machís scored into an empty net. 

Even though Italy possessed adaptable players on the field, it does not mean that it can escape you against moments of high pressure, or stop the opponent from matching your shape without the time to adjust. The Italians controlled the possession but it was not like they were clear from issues: right-footed Scalvini was positioned on the left of the buildup and the ball did not flow to Chiesa, who was hugging the touchline. Furthermore, with Udogie always positioned in the halfspace, Chiesa had a very tough time moving the ball back towards the center or rotating into such space with occupants always there. 

Venezuela 1-2 Italy (22nd minute): Progressive issues for Italy. Venezuela constricted Italy by keeping their inside forwards very narrow. As Udogie dribbled the ball inward, Yordan Osorio (his man marker) dropped back and switched occupiers with Wilker Ángel to step up on Bonaventura and Italy’s options were very limited in the center of the rotation.

With Udogie in this position, Italy built more in a 3-3-4 formation with Bonaventura and Frattesi exchanging their spots and Juve’s Chiesa and Cambiaso hugging the touchline. Retegui, one of Mancini’s late finds, came in clutch with two goals, but Venezuela had caused the Italians a lot of frustration. 

Rotations were cleaner against Ecuador, not much of a surprise when three of the back five play for Inter and Jorginho dropped between the wide split of the center-backs more consistently, Barella also made movements ahead whilst Pellegrini and Raspadori dropped to join in the circulation. Fluidity in movement does not equate to fluidity in passing and Ecuador was capable of effectively applying a high press which disrupted Italy from progressing out from the back. 

Jorginho operated more as a single pivot than Locatelli had displayed against Venezuela, and his movements deep saw Pellegrini fill in the vacant space and Italy situationally resembled a 3-1-4-2 formation. Although the positions are adjustable, this is a team that has yet to display a deep buildup as smoothly as Mancini’s EURO team had accomplished.

Italy 2-0 Ecuador (14^th minute): Positional adjustments disrupt Ecuador from matching Italy’s shape. Jorginho dropped as Raspadori opened a passing angle and Bellanova began his charge forward on the right side. Barella opened up his body when he received and put the ball behind the wing-back.

In the first half, the best access would come through Raoul Bellanova on the right touchline and the advantage of attacking with wing-backs is that your far-sided partner is often free at the back post, in this case Dimarco. Bellanova was released in a couple of different manoeuvres but mostly came through up-back-and-through combinations from Raspadori or Zaniolo dropping and Barella having the vision to put the ball behind the defensive line for Bellanova to sprint onto.

Italy accomplished a 2-0 win, Pellegrini smacked Dimarco’s blocked free kick in from a similar position that the foul was made. Barella scored the second goal late on, sprinting onto Orsolini’s excellent slide-rule pass with the Ecuadorian defense heavily displaced. 

Different defensive approaches for different occasions

The most traditional arrangement from a Spalletti team off the ball is to move into a 4-4-1-1 shape, which starts in a more passive state but engages in a more man-orientated fashion when the team engages higher. Against Ukraine at the San Siro, Italy approached their opponents in such a manner and allowed Ukraine to exchange until one of their center-backs stepped forward with the ball or a pass was made to the fullback positioned in an area where his space to turn was limited. 

Italy 2-1 Ukraine (11th minute): Buildup to the first goal from Italy. Man-marking in the midfield and pressing out of the medium block, Ukraine where forced to move the ball towards the channel and Konoplia slipped to allow Zaccagni through.

Their first goal was a good example of what traps their off-ball scheme can create. As the ball was moved back from Ukraine, Frattesi (the man just behind Raspadori) had dropped in the same line as Barella to cover Locatelli man marking one of the Ukraine attackers positioned behind. Illia Zabarnyi’s passing lane towards his midfield was blocked and this enabled Mattia Zaccagni to close the distance on the right-back, who Zabarnyi would pass the ball to. Yukhym Konoplia slipped on the ball, but the action did not happen without Frattesi adjusting in the first place. 

Alternatively, Ukraine did find success when going more direct to the forward line as Italy’s defensive line followed their man markers when their opponent dropped into the midfield. Away to England, their pressing was a lot more cautious, sitting more in their medium block and allowing Stephan El Shaarawy to follow Kyle Walker deep into the defensive line. But the aggressiveness of the man-marking remained and England’s first goal saw Declan Rice slice a pass through Barella and Cristante on different lines. Acerbi had jumped to Jude Bellingham and Harry Kane’s back to goal work kept Scalvini tight and space opened for Bellingham to charge straight through the center.

England 3-1 Italy (27th minute): England exploits Italy’s man-marking in the midfield. Barella positioned himself high against Phillips, but this created room for Bellingham to drop and slip behind Acerbi after he flicked the ball towards Kane.

Just like his approaches in possession, different opponents require different solutions to nullify them and Spalletti dials down the intensity regardless of the opponent. In their 3-4-2-1 experiment, Italy faced difficulty when they were deeper as their defensive line had to engage higher up the field to plug the gaps. Venezuela dragged Di Lorenzo high up the field and made a blindside run past Buongiorno to pump the ball down Italy’s right channel. They were able to create an excellent chance for Rondón early in that game. 

Spalletti also explained in his press conference before these games that: “If you are balanced, then a three-man defense is less open to the counter-attack.” Neither South American team created a chance directly from a counterattack in their encounters, but the split between Barella and Jorginho did create a platform for some occasions to spring into action, one which a better transitional set-up may have exploited to greater effect.

Off the ball, Italy are strong when their aggressive man-marking has intensity, but opponents have had joy when they are in a more passive state. Italy have had good defensive displays under Spalletti, none more so than keeping Ukraine quiet in Leverkusen, even when the control had slipped out from their hands; and a questionable penalty call going their way with a couple of minutes left. With Spain and Croatia also in their group, the tendency may be to remain more compact in a medium block as opposed to pressing high. 

Takeaways

Italy entered EURO 2020 blooming from a renaissance under Mancini. Now the pillars between a good and bad tournament performance are much wider: not just from the difference in quality within the groups (Turkey, Switzerland and Wales to Albania, Spain and Croatia) but also the state that the Italian team is in. 

Mancini had a strong center-back partnership that had played together for a long time, guys like Insigne and Spinazzola who had great chemistry together and a strong midfield trio, Jorginho, Barella and Verratti that worked with the ball in different ways to each other. Spalletti has just two of those midfield options and new relationships have not formed as fully as those that they are replacing. 

But this is also a coach who has performed without resources stacked behind him. A coach that can tweak and adjust to unlock. Spalletti is missing another player up top who can be reliable in holding the ball for long periods but has established techniques to get them there. Albania, Spain and Croatia are not an easy group to navigate through and how these techniques bypass those national teams of that caliber remains to be seen. 

We decided to make all of our EURO 2024 articles free to read. If you want to support our work, consider taking a subscription.