France Didier Deschamps Tactical Preview EURO 2024

French-led Deschemption

Eighteen years since Marco Materazzi hit the deck from a Zinedine Zidane headbutt, France are back in Germany, under tournament conditions, ready to make amends. But if they are to clinch the EUROs under Didier Deschamps, it will have to be through his tried and tested methods. 

Written by Joel Parker.

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French football history in Germany has been a complicated one. They didn’t even qualify for the 1974 World Cup nor the 1988 European Championships in West Germany, despite being the holders and finishing third in Mexico ’86. The route to the 2006 World Cup final was not without a rocky path. Draws to Switzerland and South Korea meant that they needed to beat Togo, without a suspended Zidane, just to get out of the group. They clicked into gear to get past Spain, Brazil and Portugal, but Italy provided their greatest frustration, Zidane especially.

Of course, a World Cup has been achieved by Deschamps since then, who is their longest-serving head coach. However, the EUROs have constantly dangled out of his grasp. Portugal beat them in extra time when they hosted the competition, Switzerland shocked them at EURO 2020 after they had left a good impression in their opening game in Munich, versus Germany. Add that to more final heartache against Argentina in Qatar and France have no reason to be unmotivated at the first opportunity back in tournament conditions.

The French squad is stacked full of talent, many of which still not being picked, but the cycle for some of the attackers feels close to an end. Olivier Giroud is thirty-seven and about to cross the Atlantic, Antoine Griezmann is thirty-three but is still influential at Atléti, and N’golo Kanté is the same age and has already made the big money jump to Al-Ittihad. 

Deschamps has already gone down as one of France’s most influential football figures, winning the EUROs is the final bow he needs to add to his cap. If France are to achieve this feat, it will have to be through his code and his cautious tactics that he has stuck by throughout his long tenure. 


Griezmann connects the dotted lines

So what makes his tactics cautious? From their 4-2-3-1/4-3-3 structure, there is not much rotation or positional adjustment to observe from the defense and midfield. It is well documented that international coaches don’t have as much time on the training ground to create and integrate ideas into their teams, but Deschamps has remained concrete in his game plans – even if he hasn’t always stuck to a back four. 

Although their deeper buildup has remained risk-averse, it does not mean that Deschamps has not experimented with different positional arrangements within his ideas. For the EUROs at home soil, Deschamps settled with Moussa Sissoko playing to the right of the attack. At the World Cup in Russia, this evolved to Blaise Matuidi taking up the left role with a young Kylian Mbappé positioned on the right. During this period, Antoine Griezmann was always appearing in deeper areas to connect the dotted lines, positioned behind the striker in some games along the way. 

In Qatar, Deschamps took this a step further by starting Griezmann further down the chain and on the right side of a midfield three. This dynamic has remained in place in a buildup structure that has players remaining in very traditional roles: Aurélien Tchouaméni often plays as a single pivot and is very close to the two center-backs alongside him, with his Real Madrid teammate Eduardo Camavinga also within his perimeter. The alternative option is Adrien Rabiot making a lot of off-ball runs to support the left side, a role that other midfielders like Youssouf Fofana, Warren Zaïre-Emery and Kanté can combine in. It is in these phases that their 4-2-3-1 shape turns into more of a 4-3-3 structure.


Netherlands 1-2 France (6th minute): Buildup to Mbappé’s first goal. Lateral movement from Griezmann dragged Marten de Roon out of position and Coman dropped to connect with Konaté now the passing lane was open. Clauss joined the attack, overlapping the winger who had dropped slightly narrower.

Netherlands 1-2 France (6th minute): Buildup to Mbappé’s first goal. Lateral movement from Griezmann dragged Marten de Roon out of position and Coman dropped to connect with Konaté now the passing lane was open. Clauss joined the attack, overlapping the winger who had dropped slightly narrower.


It is the movement of Griezmann that allows France to move the ball between the lines. With two midfielders already deep France can create a lot of vacant space for Griezmann to adjust his position and drop into to combine. What helps France is that they have a number of center-backs that can put disguise in their passing or are consistently good at splitting opposition lines: Ibrahima Konaté, William Saliba, Dayot Upamecano and Benjamin Pavard is some roster to select from in this regard.

When making his adjustments, Griezmann can move in a variety of different ways to create access. When individually man-marked, he can drag his marker into their own defensive line or move laterally away from the channel to allow the winger to drop in and take the ball on the turn. These movements are effective at quickly changing the tempo, with forwards narrow and in areas to combine and having a fullback holding the width to support the attacking move.


France 2-0 Ireland (47th minute): Buildup to Thuram’s goal. Griezmann takes the ball on against an Irish overload, but the Frenchman combines with Thuram to evade the pressure and Theo Hernández was in a golden position to cut the ball back into the box.

France 2-0 Ireland (47th minute): Buildup to Thuram’s goal. Griezmann takes the ball on against an Irish overload, but the Frenchman combines with Thuram to evade the pressure and Theo Hernández was in a golden position to cut the ball back into the box.


If Griezmann takes the ball himself, he is very strong at moving the ball in tight spaces. In his more lateral runs, Griezmann constantly makes access for one-twos to be available and his adjustment in his position allows the attack to follow suit. Depending on the midfield selection, Griezmann is usually more fixed in the right halfspace area, but his license to roam behind the midfield line sees him appear in areas across the attack and become the connective tissue to the French body. 


The double-edged sword

However, where we really see the cautiousness of Deschamps and his methods comes in the arrangement of his team out of possession. This is a team that rarely presses out of their defensive block, opting to remain in a compact shape that is very quick to reset into its structure – all except the captain, Mbappé. This can make the French defensive structure seem chaotic and unorganized, even more so when France is against a team that controls the ball for long periods against their set-up. 



When resetting in their shape, it often appears that Mbappé is disconnected from the arrangement or in a free role that puts the opposition fullback in a peculiar position: to take up his attacking position or hang back himself in case of the transition. And so the double-edged sword is being pointed at by the French, both towards themselves and the opponent. With the likes of Mbappé, Griezmann, Randal Kolo Muani or Ousmane Dembélé on the transition, the opponents themselves are going to be cautious of the counterattacking ability that France has in its locker. Even if the first phase is stopped, it is tough for a defensive line to reset if you have an outlet like Giroud on crosses, even Kolo Muani and Marcus Thuram have the box presence available on crosses if needs be. 

On top of this, keeping a compact defensive shape is going to encourage the opponent to take more dangerous passes/long balls to try and bypass the threat of a counterattack. The French defensive line is more than capable of bossing these aerial duels or swallowing up the space on the second ball, another advantage of Deschamps often keeping his midfielders deep and close to the center-backs.

In turn, if a team decides to set up their attack as normal, then France will come up against an overload somewhere within the system if the opposition is capable of progressing through. Teams can still play through the French set-up in a shorter distance, their recent friendly against Germany was a great example of how a box-like arrangement could disrupt their approach, with their fullbacks against the wide midfielders of the French setup.


France 0-2 Germany (35th minute): Passive France showed vulnerabilities against Germany’s box-like arrangement. As Tchouaméni dropped back to reset, Jamal Musiala was in a position to receive on the half-turn. With Wirtz and Gündoğan in halfspace positions, Musiala appeared as a free option in a central but versatile German attack. Kai Havertz’s run was connected but Germany could not get a shot off in this phase.

France 0-2 Germany (35th minute): Passive France showed vulnerabilities against Germany’s box-like arrangement. As Tchouaméni dropped back to reset, Jamal Musiala was in a position to receive on the half-turn. With Wirtz and Gündoğan in halfspace positions, Musiala appeared as a free option in a central but versatile German attack. Kai Havertz’s run was connected but Germany could not get a shot off in this phase.


Toni Kroos and Robert Andrich built the base that disrupted Thuram’s defensive position and encouraged one of the French midfielders to shoot out of their spot. As İlkay Gündoğan and Florian Wirtz bounced between the lines, depending on which side the ball was positioned, this either opened up a lane to one of the attackers behind Tchouaméni or bunched the French midfield together, Zaïre-Emery tucking in to cover the midfielder pressing out, and therefore creating a passing lane to Maximilian Mittelstädt at left back. 

The French set-up is a unique one, it remains difficult to get shots off and its compact nature makes it difficult for teams, without the midfield technicians, to progress through, but it is not without its vulnerabilities. In the defensive third, France does concede good chances coming from the left side of the defense. Pointing towards Mbappé not dropping back is quite a lazy conclusion when most world-class attackers aren’t in those positions to defend at high-end club structures.


France 3-2 Chile (5th minute): Buildup to Marcelino Núñez’s goal. Theo Hernández was dragged away from the box by Isla in possession, Osorio runs out from an offside position, but the spaces are available for Alexis Sánchez to connect a one-two.

France 3-2 Chile (5th minute): Buildup to Marcelino Núñez’s goal. Theo Hernández was dragged away from the box by Isla in possession, Osorio runs out from an offside position, but the spaces are available for Alexis Sánchez to connect a one-two.


Theo Hernández is a very strong attacking outlet from the left-back spot, but his tendency to track opponents on the touchlines can leave access behind him if the French attack is not set. A halfspace run can drag the French teammate that is covering Hernández, and when the winger has made the pass to the third man, Hernández is not always the most reliable at winning the foot race from the player he was following. 

Defensively, the French are a curious team to observe. At times, their super compactness overrides their opponent and they are unable to maintain momentum. On the other hand, there are vulnerabilities to exploit. 


Tradition kept with fullbacks and wingers

In the attack, even with Griezmann having the license to appear in different spaces, it is clear that Deschamps will not comprise his fullbacks moving forward, without a midfielder covering their spots. The fullbacks overlap and hold width for the French attack to tuck into more central areas and combine. 


France 3-2 Chile (21st minute): Buildup to Mbappé chance. The combination between forwards is made by fullbacks taking advanced positions down both channels. Kolo Muani shifted into a central spot to make a one-two with Fofana, whose inside carry opened the access towards Giroud, who flicked back onto Kolo Muani. Giroud then received the ball back and knocked the ball out wide towards Theo Hernández, whose low ball was just too quick for Mbappé to react cleanly.

France 3-2 Chile (21st minute): Buildup to Mbappé chance. The combination between forwards is made by fullbacks taking advanced positions down both channels. Kolo Muani shifted into a central spot to make a one-two with Fofana, whose inside carry opened the access towards Giroud, who flicked back onto Kolo Muani. Giroud then received the ball back and knocked the ball out wide towards Theo Hernández, whose low ball was just too quick for Mbappé to react cleanly.


In this area, Theo Hernández is ideal for Mbappé to combine with in order to unlock his favorite zone, cutting onto his right foot from the left channel. For the national team, Hernández does not drop into more central attacking zones like he does at Milan, but it’s an understandable trade-off when Mbappé cuts back inside and still has a creative outlet available on the outside if needs be. Ferland Mendy has a similar dynamic but is even more glued to the touchline than Theo Hernández is. 

A similar relationship can be seen on the right side through Jonathan Clauss, who is also a little more comfortable coming inside but ultimately hugs the touchline to allow Kingsley Coman or Dembélé to drop in. Either that or as the fullback passes to the winger, both hugging the touchline, the fullback overlaps the winger as they are controlling the ball and are aiming to take on their marker one-versus-one. The only exception comes from Jules Koundé, who situationally takes up a slightly narrower position but does not underlap with Dembélé on the right, usually because Griezmann already taking up the zone inside to exchange positions. 


France 4-1 Scotland (11th minute): The elements coming together. Griezmann pushed forward to drag McKenna, which created space for Dembélé to drop and Clauss to overlap in the outer channel. The movement ended with Dembélé being fouled by Gilmour, but it showcases the change of tempo that this pattern can lead to.

France 4-1 Scotland (11th minute): The elements coming together. Griezmann pushed forward to drag McKenna, which created space for Dembélé to drop and Clauss to overlap in the outer channel. The movement ended with Dembélé being fouled by Gilmour, but it showcases the change of tempo that this pattern can lead to.


When the fullback takes up more advanced movements, they are protected by the ball-sided center-midfielder covering the zone behind them and the combination can take place. When Deschamps wants to add more locks to the doors, he can still pick more reserved fullback options such as Benjamin Pavard or Lucas Hernández in those wider spots instead. There may be no crazy tactical inventions from Deschamps and his wide players, but the combinations between them are still very effective in breaking through the opponent. 


The wildcard

So what does happen when Deschamps’ cautious tactics are put under pressure? It would be harsh to categorize him as conservative all the time because when France needs a solution, he does roll the dice and they have had numerous forms under his spell. His shape changing has had a recurring theme, returning to a back three and if France is in a difficult position, Deschamps will look for a solution in a formation change. 

After poor results to Hungary and Portugal in the group stage, Deschamps changed to a 3-4-1-2 formation with Rabiot and Pavard as wing-backs, against Switzerland. Problems in progression occurred for two reasons. Firstly, Griezmann was still the center piece that combined the midfield with the attack, but with one less attacker to combine with, these options were limited. Secondly, all their attacks were angled down the left side with Karim Benzema and Mbappé coming more towards this channel, which made their attack very unbalanced. Better width was created when Deschamps changed back to the 4-2-3-1 shape and put on Coman, but the Swiss changed the momentum once more to shock the French.

Even in the lead-up to the World Cup, Deschamps was regularly using a back three, which had its advantages against narrow structures but organized units could contain France quite comfortably. France seems set to play in a 4-2-3-1 unit that has seen their best work under their coach but do not rule out a formation change when Deschamps feels the need to gain more solid ground or throw something to see what sticks. 



Takeaways

France has headed into almost every tournament as one of the favorites under Deschamps, this is no exception. There is a reason that the French federation has been comfortable with him under the helm, but in the same breath, there is also a conversation to be had that questions his methods (or even lack of them) have been holding an incredibly stacked French squad from achieving even more success during his tenure. 

Once again, they enter a tournament in a curious fashion. Strong elements are there, but is there enough that actually makes them the best team in the tournament? On paper, France has always had the strongest squad and we often hold their success in 2018 as a beacon of how to play in international tournaments: conservative and cautious. But is this strictly true? Italy at EURO 2020 and Argentina had more layers to their attacking structures and were able to pick up trophies on the way. France brutally faced this, yet you can make an argument that not much has changed to the offensive script – although Gibraltar will tell you a different story. 

In the group stage, France has had strong records against Austria, Netherlands and Poland in recent years, but that is no guarantee that another Switzerland performance is not around the corner. France is more than capable of achieving their redemption in Germany, but whether their approach is the best path to lead them there is a difficult question to answer.  



We decided to make all of our EURO 2024 articles free to read. If you want to support our work, consider taking a subscription.

Joel Parker (24) is an Everton fan. Whenever he’s not watching his beloved Everton, Joel spends his time analyzing all sorts of football. Chief editor and Founder of Toffee Analysis. [ View all posts ]

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