The Reality Of Relationism In The Premier League
Positional versus relational. We love to pitch up opposition tents to find the “correct way to play football.” The reality is, you can only play within the constraints that the opposition puts you under, and the Premier League can place a lot against you.
Written by Joel Parker.
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England is a nation that is not accustomed to change. There has never been a great tactical or coaching tussle that has strived a change in identity, amongst English coaches at least, nor the handbags that come by a division in ideas. The separation between the top league and the rest of the football pyramid was the concrete step for private equity to assume control and bring in elite coaches down the line, elements that could easily affect the identity.
And what has become of this? We still refer to English football as a rudimental 4-4-2 formation, transfixed on the position and not the role within them. This can explain the success of positional play in the Premier League; against these regimented defensive systems, positional play is designed to work in an optimal space not only to circulate and rebuild for long periods but also provide stability on the counterpress.
This has stretched the league apart even more. The “top six” has been pulled into different directions, not just from bad management from some of those teams, but also from Arsenal, Manchester City and Liverpool going into a supernova. So with a league that has widened, a coaching culture that has remained in a similar state and a positional game that is dominating, it is a difficult ground for different ideas to build legs – especially if you are asking for those ideas not to be imitated.
Brazil’s failures at the 2022 World Cup re-sparked one of their great tactical debates; whether Tite’s positional ideas were right for the national team to compete or they had to go back to something more “Brazillian.” It is no wonder that they temporarily turned to Fernando Diniz, perhaps the figurehead of relationist football, whose rise with Fluminense has caught international attention.
But this has also brought a much wider conversation of what is a “correct” way of playing football and what isn’t. A line has been drawn in the sand between what is deemed “positional” and “relational” but this does not appreciate the mechanics that bring the ideas together.
One-twos to make you free
English football language already has phrases that can be described as relationist techniques. A ‘one-two’ passing combination is the best example, as well as ‘pass and move/go.’ The idea of constantly adapting your position on the field is a fundamental aspect of what relationist football is trying to achieve, but these techniques can be made into a positional sense too.
We can look at some incredible Premier League goals and draw the different techniques within them. Jack Wilshere’s goal against Norwich City is a great example: Wilshere produced one-two’s with both Santi Cazorla and Olivier Giroud to carve through the opposition block before side-footing the ball into the bottom corner.
Arsenal 4-1 Norwich City, October 2013 – Jack Wilshere’s goal: A quick exchange between Wilshere and Cazorla starts the run, as Giroud kept his open body position to Cazorla and backheeled into Wilshere’s path. Another one-two exchange between Wilshere and Giroud put the English midfielder through on goal to finish a fantastic move.
The constant adaptation of positions, and at such a quick tempo, meant that Norwich put very little pressure on the receiver, with Cazorla, Giroud and Wilshere all having a different option available each time they touched the ball.
Does this mean we already have relationist football in the Premier League? We can also pinpoint the one-two combination in Pep’s positionist Death Star too. These usually appear between two/three-player combinations down the channels, either to free up the more creative player in the halfspace or an overlapping run on the outer channel. This is something that we have seen Kevin de Bruyne excel at, freeing himself around the attacking third to provide a ball back into the box, or the third man run inside slips Phil Foden or Bernardo Silva in the halfspaces.
On a micro scale, we can pinpoint relation-like rotations that occur within positional systems. Ange Postecoglou at Tottenham Hotspur is a good example. Postecoglou uses positional ideas to gain an advantage, most notably from his wingers holding maximum width to stretch the opposition’s backline. But with his fullbacks sitting in narrow areas, we can see relationist techniques form between the players in much more condensed areas, to free up a player behind the opponent.
Tottenham 2-1 Liverpool, September 2023 – 10th minute: One-two combination between Yann Bissouma and Pape Matar Sarr evades Liverpool pressure in the center of the field. Once the line was broken, Sarr had a number of options to play forward to and Maddison would play the ball into Richarlison, in the next stages of the move. A low ball into the box was not connected.
It is no wonder that so much of their creativity comes from James Maddison and Pedro Porro, who benefit from the constant rotations established inside the buildup unit. We can look at more rotations and draw the relationism within them: teams that move into box midfields like to establish narrowness because short movements within that box can manipulate opponents centrally.
Pep has also brought some more relationist ideas on a micro-scale: like planting his ball retainers onto one side against a low block, as Man City did away to Brentford in the 2021/22 season. We can define the Premier League as one that utilizes positional play but look closer towards the ball and fragments of relationism can spark in some buildup units.
A league drawn to counterpressing
So could we see this converted to a much larger scale? Relationism requires creativity to form from the players, as opposed to the system, but the Premier League has seen the opposite of this form. Before Jürgen Klopp arrived at Liverpool, he stated that: “Gegenpressing lets you win back the ball nearer to the goal. No playmaker in the world can be as good as a good gegenpressing situation.”
No wonder the big clubs have become so drawn to the effectiveness of counterpressing and this is the upside of a positional game plan. With the same player constantly occupying a zone, it makes the counterpress easier to execute and more aware of the spaces surrounding them. Although relationist teams do have the players within the area of the ball, it can make the counterpress more unstable and make events more uncertain if that counterpress is beaten.
In a positional system, the defensive midfielder encounters the counterpress stepping up from a central spot, often blocking off a direct pass to the striker on transition. It is no wonder Arsenal were willing to invest so much into Declan Rice in the summer, or why players like Everton’s Amadou Onana and Wolves’ João Gomes, players that can fulfil a similar role and cover so much ground. In positional structures, they are in the optimal position to encounter a transition.
Luton Town 3-4 Arsenal, December 2023 – 1st minute: Out ball from Teden Mengi found Elijah Adebayo with Gabriel closely man marking, but as the striker controlled the bouncing ball, Rice recovered to retrieve it. Even if Rice had missed out on this, structure within Arsenal’s positional play and the lack of Luton bodies in support, would have seen a transition difficult to build legs.
Without the pretense of a positional structure in place, would City be just as safe if the ball was already behind Walker or Rodri on the transition? Would Arsenal be just as safe if the ball was behind Declan Rice? These are the scenarios that City and Arsenal would have to be comfortable with if they were producing full-scale Dinizian-style football, and with these players out of their positions without the safety of set-positions behind them . Elite players can always make up the ground, but in a league with so many effective teams on the transition (Manchester United, West Ham, Brighton to name a few), it puts a huge strain on the counterpress if they are to surrender the pivot spot.
It’s not just about the personnel being in the correct position, it’s about the angle that they are counterpressing. What makes Rodri and Rice so effective is that they are stopping attacks before they hit the space between their midfield and defensive line, prime areas where teams like Brighton try to engineer chances. Because relationist combinations require movements out of set positions, it is hard to see a Premier League team take up such patterns if it puts them in jeopardy during the transition.
It giveth, then taketh
We have already mentioned the strength of counterpressing in the Premier League, and this can lead to some excellent high-pressing organizations too. Against so many high-pressing units, with high defensive lines to squeeze the pitch, your buildup unit is required to have players that can comfortably retain the ball.
We have seen two teams in the Premier League, with well-established deep buildup units, struggle to find fluency up the field this season. Brighton is the best example, a team that scores a lot but concedes a lot too. Roberto De Zerbi quickly transitioned Brighton into a team that baited teams before pinballing possession around them through rehearsed circuits, but opposition coaches discovered that sitting in a diamond could not only establish high pressure but screen one of the Brighton strikers dropping as well. Chelsea is another team that can fluently play through high-pressing units, but not to the consistency of Brighton, nor putting their attackers in advantageous areas.
Man City’s meeting with Fluminense, at the Club World Cup final last year, is not the pinnacle decider of which idea creates the “better” football, but it does give a good indication of what patterns can look like. Against a system as coordinated as City’s, Fluminense did retain the ball well in their defensive third and the constant changing of positions did create some interesting angles to cleanly break through the City press. Having said that, Fluminense committed so many players deep that it left no out ball for their attack to sustain pressure or get into dangerous areas against the City defense.
Man City 4-0 Fluminense, December 2023 – 14th minute: Player rotations exploit Man City’s high press. On the ball, Felipe Melo laid the ball off to André and his movement stopped Álvarez from squeezing pressure back towards the sideline. As Melo moved, the lane opened to Martinelli and Marcelo was the free man to move out of the press. The run from Arias was not met, as Cano did not apply further pressure on the City backline and the attack fizzled after some effective work in the deep build.
On top of this, condensing your team towards one area of the field means that the opposition is going to respond similarly. Of course, the idea is that the movements amongst players will still open this up, but Fluminense drew so many players towards one area that they eventually trapped themselves towards the corner of their defensive third.
But Fluminense still developed some unique and interesting patterns to break through against a team with the resources that no one can match on the planet. The angles they found could aid Brighton and Chelsea’s attempts when they play out of their deeper build, but this creates an interesting contradiction. The deeper build aims to open up the space behind the midfield and attack in transition-esque fashion but drop too many players towards the ball and you are reducing the amount of attackers that are playing against the last line. Is establishing a buildup unit this deep worth it if you cannot attack at pace?
Different solutions for different environments
No game of football is played the same way. There are always different dynamics, time frames and elements that can sway how one team performs/reacts against the other. Coaching with a play style in mind can produce solutions and find chemistry much easier, but the players are the only ones with full destiny with what they do on the field.
No team is directly positional or relationist because of the environments that different oppositions put them under. Under Thiago Motta, Bologna is a team in Serie A that is utilizing more relationist patterns within their buildup. With many pass-and-go patterns in the center of the pitch, Bologna has been very effective in manipulating opponents when they aim to press high against them. However, Serie A is also an environment in which more teams approach their opponents in a more man-orientated state with less onus on pressing traps.
#Bologna, #ThiagoMotta ospite all'Università: "Viviamo qualcosa di bellissimo, vogliamo godercelo fino all'ultimo secondo. Il mio tipo di gioco? Un misto tra calcio posizionale e relazionale"https://t.co/Dc2PtjsmKW
— Sportface (@sportface2016) February 27, 2024
That isn’t to discredit the work that Bologna has achieved this season, but a recognition of what kind of spaces are left open against a common opponent. When teams press high for long periods, expect those on the ball to move closer towards the carrier to support them, and when Dinizismo is in full swing, you can see games in Brazil have all the outfield players slanted towards one side of the field. To copy and paste the same cues from one set of players to the other, from one league to the next, is not a realistic ambition.
Ultimately, different environments call for different solutions and it is worth pointing out when evaluating any coaches’ ideas and what they can do for the league you want to airdrop them in. The Premier League is a league with a lot of positional play – the operation of most strikers and the use of maximum/minimal width are good examples of this. How a team responds to this out-of-possession creates the game and in the league, and if high-pressing units in the league respond to positional buildups with man-marking, then you could expect more relationist ideas to appear to manoeuvre around the opponent.
Takeaways
So could a coach like Diniz, or his ideas, come into the Premier League and be a success? If we are to consider this as full Dinizismo, then there are legitimate counterpressing concerns that top teams might not be prepared to risk, in a league that has drastically increased its transitional capabilities.
However, this is not to write off or exclude some of the in-possession ideas that are established. Like in any sport, you always have an advantage if you have an extra player available or you overload one area: all football teams aim to do this, regardless of what kind of football they are trying to achieve.
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