Brazil – Chile: Ancelotti’s Brazil dominates Chile in a night of positive tests (3-0)

Already qualified for the World Cup, Brazil completely dominated Chile, which no longer had any chances of qualification. In this context, both managers decided to run tests, each with a different purpose, and many players given opportunities by Ancelotti performed well in a match where the Brazilian collective drew plenty of attention.

Tactical analysis and match report by Marcus Arboés

Since Brazil is already qualified for the 2026 World Cup, Carlo Ancelotti decided to rest players he already knows and trusts, such as Vinícius Junior and Rodrygo, giving opportunities to other names he wanted to test. With that, Brazil lined up in a 4-2-3-1 outline: Alisson (Liverpool) in goal; Wesley (Roma), Marquinhos (PSG), Gabriel Magalhães (Arsenal) and Douglas Santos (Zenit) in defense; Casemiro (Manchester United) and Bruno Guimarães (Newcastle) as holding midfielders; in attack, from Chelsea’s duo, Estêvão played on the right and João Pedro as the most advanced, Raphinha (Barcelona) operated as the second striker and Martinelli (Arsenal) on the left.

With no chance of reaching the World Cup, interim coach Nicolás Córdova opted to start the cycle early for those who will try to play the 2030 edition. For this reason, he left out the stars of Chile’s “golden generation”: Vidal, Sánchez and Medel. The team lined up in a 3-4-3 formation: Vigouroux (Swansea) in goal; in defense: Iván Román (bench at Atlético Mineiro), Paulo Díaz (River Plate) and Maripán (Torino); Hormazábal (Universidad) and Suazo (Sevilla) as wingbacks; Loyola (Independiente) and Pizarro (Colo Colo) as midfielders; Ben Brereton Díaz (Derby County), Cepeda (Colo Colo) and Aravena (Grêmio) as forwards.

Judging by the clubs of the players, one could already imagine Brazil’s superiority. Even so, in this testing context, the match proved to be much more than the initial narrative, and that is what we are going to explore.

Brazilian relational football

Gradually, we are beginning to see the impact of Carlo Ancelotti’s ideas as Brazil’s coach: a relational/functional football, supported, with freedom, autonomy and plenty of protagonism for the players, especially those up front. You may more easily find the definition of this tactical playstyle as “relationism”, but in Brazil, the term “functional” became popular, which is a synonym and refers exactly to building a model of play that relies more on functions than on fixed positions.

To understand how Brazil plays, we first need to interpret each player’s functions, since the coach used them in ways that resemble their roles at their clubs, creating a mobile attack not so dependent on strict positional zones.

Role by role, let’s start with the fullbacks: Douglas Santos, from Zenit, practically played as a third left center-back, since he contributes much more in connections and support than by overlapping, the type of fullback who pairs well with a winger that holds width, like Martinelli. On the other side, Wesley, who often plays as a wingback in a much more offensive role at Roma, was given the starting spot to push high up, since Estêvão was acting almost as a number ten drifting from the right side.

Brazil attacking by the right side with Raphinha and Estêvão having positional freedom to approach, while Martinelli keeps his position in width.

Before the match began, reports leaked that Ancelotti would use four attackers, and many people were uncomfortable, imagining a 4-2-4 positional outline, already used unsuccessfully by Brazil under Dorival Junior. But the Italian manager, in practice, placed three wingers rotating behind the striker:

Estêvão, the right winger, had freedom to play as a playmaker due to his dribbling and creative ability; Raphinha played as he does at Barcelona, a direct, fast attacker exploiting central spaces but also capable of contributing in buildup; Martinelli provided what he gives Arsenal: a left winger who supports but also has the pace and dribbling to take on defenders in isolation.

They constantly rotated positions, confusing the Chilean defense that, in order to cope with the Brazilian mobility and short connections, split its defenders into two blocks: five in the back line, with the wingbacks stepping out to press, while the two midfielders and three forwards marked man-to-man, shifting side to side following Brazil’s attack. This way, they protected central spaces and covered width with the opposite wingback.

How did Brazil unlock this? Through great technical ability in tight spaces, freedom to touch the ball as many times as needed and dribble, taking risks, plus João Pedro’s movements creating layoff options and space for the wingers to attack. This highlights Brazil’s main offensive dynamic.

Brazil build-up structure to create quick attacks with one or more players supporting by inside in an asymmetric shape.

The first goal came precisely from a quick attack on the left side, with one player finding a second who served as a support for a third breaking free. Third-man dynamics in short and especially frontal spaces were a key factor, along with direct wall passes to verticalize either fast breaks or more patient attacks in the final third. João Pedro, beyond creating space, interpreted this type of play excellently, acting as a playmaking striker.

This also explains that third-man dynamics do not necessarily belong to teams playing positional football and that a triangulation is not automatically a third-man pattern, just as wall passes and other relational mechanisms can also be used by positional play teams.

In the goal sequence, Raphinha and Estêvão were more aligned to their starting zones, but it was common to see Casemiro and Bruno Guimarães supporting from deeper while two attackers dropped inside to overload one side with at least seven players. With the right winger drifting inside, Wesley used the free space, but Brazil sought more long balls, leveraging Bruno Guimarães’ passing range at Newcastle, than switches aiming for the Roma fullback wide on the right.

Brazil’s defensive evolution

In the second half, we saw more moments of Chile reaching the attack, testing how Brazil defended in a low block. This allowed us to observe some interesting patterns and an improvement compared to previous managers, both under Dorival and Fernando Diniz, and this is directly linked to the leadership, presence and confidence that Casemiro brings – even if not at his peak, he remains a crucial player.

Chile attacking in a 3-4-3 formation while Brazil uses a 4-4-2 shape with man-oriented defense. Casemiro protects the zone 14 and Martinelli watches the width.

Chile attacked in a 3-4-3 shape, with little involvement from the center-backs in buildup. For that reason, Pizarro and Loyola, the midfielders, initiated the plays, while Suazo and Hormazábal stayed wide looking for crosses to Cepeda, Brereton and Aravena. Brazil, in turn, defended with man-oriented matchups, starting from a 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 shape that easily dissolved into individual chases and marking priorities.

In this defensive structure, Estêvão protected the flank, while Bruno Guimarães stepped out to press inside or track runners, and Raphinha tucked in centrally. Casemiro stayed deeper protecting the edge of the box, while Martinelli covered potential switches toward Hormazábal. On the backline, Brazil stayed compact, but the fullback always stepped out to press if a wingback received wide. This was easy to manage because the absence of Chilean center-backs in buildup left them with a significant numerical disadvantage.

That was the pattern early in the second half: Brazil comfortable, Chile experimenting with a younger generation still developing for the next cycle. The game dropped in intensity and quality until Brazil’s substitutions: Luiz Henrique, Kaio Jorge, Lucas Paquetá and Andrey Santos came on, all facing Ancelotti’s “test.”

Brazil’s high pressing block in a 4-1-3-2 shape to man-mark the sides while the opposite winger does the trap.

Probably the biggest positive note among those given opportunities was Luiz Henrique, although Kaio Jorge and Paquetá also played well. The Zenit right winger, who was the standout player of the 2024 Copa Libertadores with Botafogo, changed the game, directly involved in the buildup of Brazil’s last two goals.

On one of them, Luiz Henrique stood out by intercepting Chile’s buildup, exploiting a gap. Brazil’s high block pressing was well-organized to prevent Chile, which shifted into a 4-2-4 shape with the right fullback pushed forward, always trying to go vertical with long passes or switches, but failing to connect and losing many duels in midfield.

To counter that, Brazil used a 4-1-3-2 defensive system, often applied worldwide to press in a high block. The striker and attacking midfielder initiated pressure on the ball-carrier. The second midfielder stepped up to form a line of three with the wingers. Of these, the winger on the ball-side pressed the fullback, while Bruno Guimarães shielded the center and the far-side winger positioned strategically to protect against switches. It was exactly in this gap that Luiz Henrique won possession.

Takeaways

After that, Chile made more substitutions, testing players, but too late to change the tactical outlook or create more chances against Alisson. A 3-0 result was fair, though Brazil could have scored more. Chile showed it needs to build a new generation and still has many gaps, while Brazil showed signs of improvement with good months ahead of the World Cup.

Already eliminated, Chile will play its last qualifier against Uruguay, which is also already qualified, next Tuesday. Another chance for players based in South America to gain minutes.

Meanwhile, Carlo Ancelotti’s Brazil displayed quality even without Vinícius Jr and Neymar, but will close the qualifiers against Bolivia, still fighting for a spot. A more fitting challenge in the altitude, which may allow further tests for players the coach still wants to evaluate, such as Caio Henrique (Monaco), Samuel Lino (Flamengo) and Jean Lucas (Bahia).