Liverpool – Brighton & Hove Albion: Slot’s Renewed Midfield Focus (2-0)

Arne Slot set his Liverpool team up to overload the midfield here, and it worked well against Brighton’s man-oriented defensive system. Two goals from Hugo Ekitike were enough to see the Reds through here, despite their continued defensive issues.

Tactical analysis and match report by Josh Manley.

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Arne Slot’s Liverpool side have seemingly managed to stem the flow of defeats in the last couple of weeks, coming into this game on the back of wins over West Ham and Inter, plus draws with Leeds United and Sunderland. They also had Mohamed Salah back in the squad for this match, after last weekend’s mixed-zone outburst had seen him exiled from the team for their midweek Champions League game.

Brighton meanwhile were level on points with Liverpool prior to this match, although their last two matches – both at home – saw them underperform expectations as they were beaten by Aston Villa, and drawing against West Ham.

Liverpool started in a 4-2-3-1 shape here, with Joe Gomez, Ibrahima Konaté, Virgil van Dijk, and Milos Kerkez making up the back four. Ryan Gravenberch and Curtis Jones partnered in central midfield, with Dominik Szoboszlai, Alexis Mac Allister, and Florian Wirtz as the attacking midfield trio behind striker Hugo Ekitike.

Fabian Hürzeler also lined his side up in a 4-2-3-1 formation with a back four of Mats Wieffer, Jan Paul van Hecke, Lewis Dunk, and Ferdi Kadıoğlu. The double pivot comprised Carlos Baleba and Jack Hinshelwood, with Brajan Gruda at number ten. Yankuba Minteh and Diego Gómez then flanked Georginio Rutter up front.

Liverpool’s central focus

The home side had the dream start to the game with Ekitike’s goal in the first minute. They continued to have a good share of the possession in the first half though, with Slot’s renewed possession idea being of interest.

Slot has experimented with various ideas to get his Liverpool team firing again. In midweek, he used a diamond midfield against Inter. In this game against Brighton, the initial shape was slightly different, but the idea of trying to dominate the center of the pitch was still present.

Liverpool were nominally in a 4-2-3-1 shape. When they had the ball though, Jones often dropped into the backline, especially into the left back space when Kerkez pushed forward. This left Gravenberch as the number six, while Szoboszlai would also tuck into the right halfspace as Joe Gomez pushed forward on the right. Wirtz did similar on the left, tucking into the left halfspace, while Mac Allister was the number ten.

Brighton’s high press often left spaces behind the central midfielders.

Brighton’s defensive scheme was man-oriented, which led to them contorting themselves into some awkward midfielder arrangements in order to try and follow their nominal opponents. Most notably, Baleba and Hinshelwood needed to move very far forward to get close to Jones and Gravenberch, especially for Baleba when Jones would drop into Liverpool’s backline.

The problem was that Liverpool simply had a midfield overload due to the likes of Mac Allister and Wirtz drifting between the lines as Baleba and Hinshelwood jumped forward. Brighton’s defenders were not really coordinated in terms of pushing out of the backline to close this space or mark Liverpool’s attacking midfielders.

This continued throughout, although in a slightly different manner when Gomez was injured midway through the first half and was replaced by Salah, meaning Szoboszlai moved to right back.

Liverpool later had Salah playing wide, and Szoboszlai at right back.

After this, Liverpool often started their possession phases with a double-wing occupation on the right, before Szoboszlai would move into deep right halfspace areas as the attack progressed into Brighton’s half.

Defensive issues remain

The change in the first half also altered how Liverpool defended. In their initial lineup, they were defending in a compact 4-2-3-1 shape, with the occasional jumping forward of a central midfielder to sometimes form a 4-1-4-1 formation against the ball.

With Salah joining the fray though, the particularities of his defensive role on the right side became a factor. Salah would remain high and relatively narrow, while Mac Allister continued in his number ten role. Wirtz meanwhile was deeper and narrower on the left. This meant Liverpool’s pressing now resembled either a lopsided 4-2-3-1 formation, or a 4-3-1-2 shape, depending on one’s perspective.

Brighton meanwhile mostly built in a 4-2-4-0 shape. Rutter and Gruda essentially operated as two number tens dropping into Liverpool’s midfield, Wieffer often made indenting runs from right back, while Kadıoğlu and Diego Gómez occupied the left wing sometimes with double-wing occupation, and sometimes with one indenting.

Liverpool’s asymmetric mid-block defense. 

An issue for Liverpool was that the deepest midfielder could be overloaded by Gruda and Rutter and therefore they were able to receive between the lines if Liverpool’s center-backs did not jump out quickly.

This was an issue for Jones who was often the deepest player in the 4-3-1-2-like structures in the first half. In some early phases of the second half, Liverpool had a couple of phases where they jumped from a 4-2-3-1 formation into a 4-1-4-1 shape against Brighton’s first-phase buildup and something similar happened, where Gravenberch was overloaded as Jones jumped forward.

Furthermore, when defending in a deeper block, Liverpool still occasionally showed vulnerability in their midfield in terms of strong coverage of the number six zone in front of their penalty box. The overall defensive organization was often still not strong enough in these situations.

Stable enough to win

Ekitike added a second goal on the hour mark, and Liverpool would start to defend deeper in the second half in order to try and protect their lead. This saw another structural adjustment to improve the defensive stability.

Mac Allister would increasingly drop deeper to become part of a midfield three with Gravenberch and Jones, and this trio would defend in front of the Liverpool box as a flat three. This liberated Wirtz slightly from some of his defensive duties, and he was seen staying a bit higher on the left, or acting as a number ten in a 4-3-1-2 shape with Salah and Ekitike staying higher ahead of him.

Brighton started making changes too, with Kaoru Mitoma and Yasin Ayari replacing Gruda and Hinshelwood. Diego Gómez then played as the number ten, with Mitoma on the left. Hürzeler’s side often sought Mitoma as their outlet on the left to try and create dynamics in their attack, and he did have a couple of good moments. Kadıoğlu would increasingly take a narrower role to allow the Japanese international to try and get isolated against Szoboszlai.

Liverpool defended deeper in the second half. 

Eventually, Slot would make his own changes to add further defensive stability. Wirtz was replaced by Robertson, and Liverpool now defended in a 4-4-2 formation. Jones switched to the right, Mac Allister and Gravenberch were central, and Robertson was the left midfielder.

This changed again shortly afterwards as Federico Chiesa replaced Szoboszlai, with Jones now at right back. But in any case, these changes were enough to help Liverpool get over the line for the three points as they look to revive their season.