Germany – Netherlands: Nagelsmann’s Tactical Triumph (1-0)

Germany’s tactical superiority was evident in their UEFA Nations League match against the Netherlands. Julian Nagelsmann’s side applied relentless high pressing, stifling Dutch attempts to build up play. Continuing the trend, Koeman depended on half-time adjustments to find a way into the match. Overall, this game showcased an intriguing tactical battle, shaped by pressing patterns and in-game adaptations.

Tactical analysis and match report by Sander IJtsma.

Germany hosted the Netherlands at the Allianz Arena for the fourth round of this year’s UEFA Nations League. The hosts had the clear upper hand towards winning this group after last week’s unexpected drop of points from Holland in Hungary. After saying goodbye to retired international legends Thomas Müller, Toni Kroos, Ilkay Gundogan and Manuel Neuer, a minute of applause sounded to Johan Neeskens and Dieter Budenski. 

Just over a year into his tenure, Julian Nagelsmann has firmly imprinted his ideas on this Germany side, but on the night he had to deal with an impressive collection of absentees. The usual goalkeepers were all unavailable, as well as key players like Jamal Musiala and Kai Havertz. So, Oliver Baumann played in goal, behind a nominal back four of Maximillian Mittelstädt, Nico Schlotterbeck, Antonio Rüdiger and Joshua Kimmich. The pivot was completely transformed in comparison to the former meeting between these teams and was formed by Aleksandar Pavlovic and Angelo Stiller, behind a three-band of debutant Jamie Leweling, Florian Wirtz and Serge Gnabry. Up front played Tim Kleindienst.

The Netherlands, under Ronald Koeman, are fresh off a rather disappointing clash with Hungary, having lost captain Virgil van Dijk to a red card and having failed to create meaningful offense against a well-organized deep defense. Bart Verbruggen played in goal, behind Jorrel Hato, Micky van der Ven, Stefan de Vrij and Denzel Dumfries. The pivot was – more on that later – formed by Quinten Timber and Ryan Gravenberch. Tiijani Reijnders played as the number ten, with Cody Gakpo and Xaxi Simons on the left and right flank and Bryan Brobbey central.

Planning, preparation, execution

One minute, forty-one seconds. That’s all it took for Germany to convert complete control into an opening goal. Posing very high in a 2-2-fluid-offense shape, they restricted their Dutch opponents to a handful of clearances, and found multiple threatening passes already. Ultimately, VAR chalked off the goal for a marginal offside, which provided a lifeline to the Dutch and probably saved this from being a very very one-sided affair. 

Playing a superior – or at the very least equal – opponent away is always going to be a tough task. And tough tasks call for planning and preparation, followed by neat execution. Watching from the outside, it’s always a challenge to identify where in this chain things break down, but breaking down it did for Ronald Koeman and the Dutch national team.

The ninth minute provided a great example of their failed high press, with players constantly communicating and gesturing while in the middle of a five-on-five pressing situation. Adjusting this on the fly was never going to work, and with Xavi Simons swimming in space between left-sided central defender Schlotterbeck and left-back Mittelstädt, Germany was offered more than enough space and time to combine through the heart of the pitch. Suboptimal execution led to a rather angled shot by Kleindienst and an uncomplicated save by Verbruggen. Just a minute later, it was rinse-and-repeat and Mittelstädt’s shot was relatively easily parried by Verbruggen.

Dutch choices

This was a match where dominating possession against the expected fierce German press was always going to be a very tough uphill battle. In that sense, one really has to wonder what the idea was behind fielding a double pivot of Quinten Timber and Ryan Gravenberch, with the first a dynamic energetic eight, and the latter excelling big time as Liverpool’s midfield distributor and ball progressor this season. On top of that, both pivots played mostly on the same line in possession, which completely stifled the buildup play.

Either Koeman’s belief must have been that his team would be able to play out from under that pressure. Or else, you would end up playing with mostly on-ball players out of possession in a medium-low 4-4-2 block. And that’s what we saw for most of the first half. Basically all Dutch players played way behind their usual levels, and that can hardly be seen other than playing outside their prime strengths.

This is what a stiffled buildup looks like.

Painful minutes

Out of possession play is probably the most interesting and underrated aspect of play. While most of the attention and commentary will be aimed at on-ball events, outcomes are usually very dependent on off-ball positioning and the coordination of a particular type of pressing. On that front, Germany presented a very interesting watch.

Rather than watching a five minute highlight clip, focusing on minute fifteen to seventeen in full might be the best choice. It starts off with Schlotterbeck dribbling into midfield, taking advantage of the two-versus-one overload on Simons. You’ll see the German counterpress winning a high turnover, followed by a Dutch defense stance with literally all eleven players in their own box in an open play situation – 15:40 to be precise. Next up, a painful own third turnover in seemingly on-the-fly choice-making during buildup play. 

Nagelsmann’s plan

Germany’s off-the-ball plan was to consistently leave Dumfries open, shifting Leweling onto Gravenberch to assist Wirtz in covering the Dutch double pivot. In theory, Simons shifting inside would open up a lot of space for Dumfries to move into, but the right-back mostly stayed behind in a four-plus-two buildup. Not being relevant on the ball apart from his final third contributions, in this role Dumfries mostly ensured the Dutch were always a man short. In addition, it led to a series of horizontal CB-to-FB passes, putting both Hato and Dumfries on the ball close to the byline. Yes, exactly what teams try to avoid by applying three-men defenses in buildup with one of their fullbacks inverting into midfield.

Germany’s pre-planned setup to leave the Dutch fullbacks open. Easy to pass to them, but then what?

Germany’s best chance of scoring came in the 28th minute, as a perfectly executed right flank combination resulted in a goal line clearance from De Vrij off a Leweling placed shot on a cutback cross. It was immediately followed by a deep turnover resulting in a wild shot by Kleindienst. Playing nearly all of your passes under pressure in your own half, almost guarantees you’ll end up paying a price for sloppy execution at some point. Poor conversion was basically the only reason the match was still level with a 7-0 shot count after half an hour of football.

For all of the first half, Germany’s high pressure was very well executed and was by far their best playmaker on the pitch, with Wirtz quite anonymous and Musiala absent.

Koeman’s adjustments

Germany outclassed the Dutch on every front in the first half, and such a degree of tactical imbalance can never be fixed in a half-time break. That said, Koeman was obviously going to make adjustments, with Mats Wieffer replacing a highly disappointing Quinten Timber, who played a deep midfield role he isn’t quite suitable to. He obviously had a very poor game, but was also played way out of his usual skill set in a very poorly coordinated system. 

Koeman’s second half-time change was Donyell Malen for Tiijani Reijnders, which moved Simons centrally. Nagelsmann brought Robert Andrich for a very subdued Wirtz, who could be seen shaking off an injury multiple times in the first half. This moved Pavlovic a bit further up in midfield.

In a slight but relevant tactical change, Gravenberch played higher both in and out of possession. This ensured more of a four-plus-one buildup for the Netherlands, which at the very least provided a better balance and also caused a degree of confusion among the German pressing system. In addition, it provided more space for either De Vrij or Van der Ven to dribble into midfield with the ball at their feet.

Pace and width

A common thread in Koeman’s time as manager was displayed once more: a poor start requiring significant half-time corrections on both a personnel and tactical front. Besides Gravenberch playing higher up, which corrected the initial phase of buildup play, the introduction of Malen ensured width and depth on both flanks. This pinned both German fullbacks and prevented them from easily closing up the center of the pitch.

Ultimately, with Holland on the brink of getting a proper stance in this match, it was a goal from a corner that gave Germany the fully deserved lead. Debutant Leweling got his goal, with a power strike into the top corner, off a failed clearance.

Attractive final phase

With Frimpong for Gakpo, moving Malen to the left, Koeman pressed the high and wide forwards button even more. Chasing a result, Holland increased the risk-taking with fresh legs allowing a significant step up in energy and work rate, at the expense of a higher line and more space for counters in midfield. Overall, Holland forced more and more of the game to take place in the German half. The best reward of that effort came in the 76th minute, as Baumann just tipped a Simons shot onto the top of the bar.

All of this ensured a very attractive final twenty minutes. On balance, the newly found openness in the game probably still meant the balance was in favor of the hosts, and with more space to play in, they inevitably created chances. However, two of the three shots (!) that Holland created in this game came after this moment.

The final five minutes even saw the classic ‘central defender as striker’ call, as De Vrij played up front, an equally classic series of failed long crosses, but also a Malen long range shot that clattered off the fist of Bauman who made his best save of the game in the ninetieth minute.

Takeaways

Football players need a tactical setup that elevates their game. This is true at any level of play, and the international stage is no exception to that. At the same time, national managers have preciously little time to work with compared to club managers. This makes tonight’s difference on a tactical level between Nagelsmann’s Germany and Koeman’s Netherlands even more remarkable.

Nagelsmann put up a very coherent and well-coordinated performance, mostly excelling off-the-ball. The German high press ensured complete control and conceding just 0.12 xG over a full game is an elite number. The main point of criticism – if needed – would probably be a lack of quality chances created. Part of this could perhaps be attributed to the absence of Havertz and Musiala, plus Wirtz subbed off at half-time.

The common threat under Koeman continued, with the team put on skates for the entirety of the first half, before getting fixed to some degree at half-time. It remains puzzling how poorly prepared the team seems for a German opponent who did exactly what could have been expected from them in the first place. Add to that the puzzling choice for a buildup scheme that invites horizontal passes to fullbacks and the questions loom bigger and bigger.

Use the arrows to scroll through all available match plots. Click to enlarge.
Check the match plots page for plots of other matches.